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FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER THE BANK HOLDING
COMPANY ACT OF 1956
AMERICAN banking structure reflects a continuing reconciliation of federal
and state interests in the control of monetary institutions. As a "necessary and
proper" adjunct to its Article I powers,' Congress maintains national fiscal
policy through the agency of federally chartered banks 2 and through the oper-
ations of the Federal Reserve System.3 Although able to pre-empt the field,
the national government has left much of banking regulation to local control.4
It has allowed the states to charter banks and to enact banking laws not in
conflict with federal legislation. 5 Further, recognizing the facility with which
1. The constitutional basis for congressional monetary control derives from "the great
powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and
conduct a war; to raise and support armies and navies," as supplemented by the neces-
sary and proper cause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). See Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421 (1884) ; Osborn v.
United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Wyatt, Federal Banking Legis-
lation, in BANKING STUDIES 39-46 (Federal Reserve System ed. 1941). See also note 4
infra.
2. First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347 (1926) ; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S.
220, 229-30 (1903). See Attorney Gen. ex rel. State Banking Comm'r v. Michigan Nat'l
Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 299 N.W. 129 (1941) ; 7 MicHi, BANKS AND BANKING c. 15, § 1
(2d ed. 1944) (hereinafter cited as MIcHIE). The public functions of national and federal
reserve banks include issuing currency; holding reserves of commercial banks and public
funds; regulating the supply, availability and interest rate of money; and generally serv-
ing as the fiscal agents of the government. See STEINER & SHAPIRO, MoNEYv AND BANK-
ixG 245-49 (3d ed. 1953). The present system of national banks was created by the Na-
tional Banking Act of 1864, REv. STAT. §§ 5133-56 (1875). Statutory provisions govern-
ing national banks are found in 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-213 (1952). Federal Reserve regulations
alo apply since national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve System. 38 STAT.
252 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 501a (1952).
3. The Federal Reserve Act, 38 STAT. 251 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522
(1952), was enacted "to provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish
an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a
more effective supervision of banking. . . ." 38 STAT. 251 (1913). See, generally, BOARD
or GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEm-, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM-ITs
PURPOSES AND FUNcTIONS (3d ed. 1954); BANKING STUDIES (Federal Reserve System
ed. 1941).
4. Commentators find each of a number of Article I powers itself sufficient to authorize
coungressional regulation of banking to the exclusion of state control. Included are the
powers to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to lay and collect
taxes, id. cl. 1, or to coin money and regulate the value thereof, id. cl. 5. See Comment,
Constitutionality of E.rclusive Federal Control over Commercial Banking, 43 YALE L.J.
454 (1934); Note, The Federal Taxing Power as a Means of Establishing a Unified
Banking Systew, 46 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1932). See also ANDERSON, FEDERA. AND STATE
CON ROL OF BANKING 339-483 (1934).
5. A state has general regulatory powers to control the banks it charters. See 1
Micii, ch. 1, §§ 1-6. The federal banking system exists independent of state regulation,
for the National Banking Act, see note 2 supra, constitutes "by itself, a complete system
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a bank might shift between federal and state systems,6 Congress has sought to
preserve the existing dual structure by making national and state bank charters
appear equally attractive.7 Dominant federal control has been exerted over
both state and federal banks, however, when necessitated by the inadequacy
of state regulation or required in the interest of national uniformity. Thus, in
establishing a single currency, federal law has precluded state issue.8 And
aware that state regulation could not afford the needed protection, Congress
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to guarantee bank de-
posits.9
The operations of bank holding companies, corporations which may own
and manage banks in many states, constitute another area in which state con-
for the establishment and government of National Banks." Cook County Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 107 U.S. 445, 448 (1882). State law is applicable to national banks, how-
ever, where it does not interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair their
efficiency as federal agencies, or conflict with the paramount authority of the United
States. Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896) ; Jennings v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U.S. 216, 219 (1935).
6. A state bank may shift to a national charter upon approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency and upon the vote of the holders of 51% of the stock. REv. STAT. § 5154
(1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 35 (1952). But conversion in contravention of state law
will -not be allowed. Ibid. Thus a state may establish its own requirements for conversion.
E.g., MICH. STAT. ANt. § 23.866 (Supp. 1955) (two-thirds stockholder assent required).
But state restrictions on conversion may be easily evaded by liquidation prior to conver-
sion. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1103.36 (Page Supp. 1956). See also S. REP. No.
1104, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949) ; Maryland v. National Bank, 33 Md. 75 (1870).
Similar provisions govern merger and consolidation. 44 STAT. 1224 (1927), as amended,
12 U.S.C. § 34a (1952) ; 66 STAT. 599 (1952), 12 U.S.C. § 34b (1952) ; 64 STAT. 455
(1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2 14-214c (Supp. III, 1956).
7. E.g., national banks were granted branching privileges equivalent to those of state
banks. 44 STAT. 1228 (1927), 48 STAT. 189 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1952). And states
may not tax national bank shares at a higher rate than competing moneyed capital. REV.
STAT. § 5219 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1952) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford,
273 U.S. 548 (1927). This policy is manifest in the grants to national banks of power to act
as fiduciaries, 38 STAT. 262 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 248(k) (1952) ; to switch
charters, see note 6 supra; to give liens on assets to secure deposits of state funds, 46 STAT.
809 (1930), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 90 (1.952) ; Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292
U.S. 559, 564 (1934) ; to pay no greater interest on time and savings deposits than state
banks, 44 STAT. 1233 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) ; and to establish certain
branches if state capital requirements are met, 44 STAT. 1227 (1927), as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 51 (1952). And see 48 STAT. 181 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1952),
forbidding national banks to pay interest on demand deposits except on state or municipal
funds where required by state law.
8. 14 STA". 146 (1866), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 1900 (1952), imposed a prohibitory
10% tax on the circulation of state bank notes. It was enacted to provide monetary uni-
formity and to foster the newly-created national bank system. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (such restriction of state banking agencies constitutional exer-
cise of Congress' paramount authority over all forms of money). See Comment, Consti-
tutionality of Exclusive Federal Control over Commercial Bmking, 43 YALE L.j. 454,
464 (1934).




trol has proved inadequate. Although an efficient business organization, the
bank holding company has exhibited characteristics inconsistent with prin-
ciples of sound banking.' 0 Its structure has permitted parent corporations to
"dump" overvalued securities upon subsidiary banks, and to obtain improperly
secured loans for non-banking corporate affiliates."- Moreover, by fostering
concentration of ownership, holding company organization has substituted
absentee control for the unit banking system commonly believed to be more
attuned to local interests and thus better equipped to serve local needs.'2
Accordingly, many states have attempted to restrict the holding company form
of group banking.'3 Some have limited the power of domestic corporations to
own bank stock.14 Others have extended their branch banking laws, hoping
so to curb both foreign and domestic holding companies.'6 But the federal
10. As a unified, centralized organization, a bank holding system can efficiently supply
affiliate banks with capital obtained from its wide market for stock issues; with trained
management personnel attracted to the corporation because of the broad opportunities avail-
able; and with services such as investment advice, trust and foreign departments, cen-
tralized accounting, auditing and purchasing, group insurance, and pension systems.
HOGENSON, THE ECONOmICS OF GRouP BANKING 139-45 (1955). See, e.g., Hearings
Before a Subconznittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 301-03 (1955) ; STEINER & SHAPIRO, MONEY AND BANKING 97-98 (3d
ed. 1953).
11. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 53-55, 104-16 (1953) ; id., 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 11-12, passim
(1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955).
12. This attitude was verbalized throughout the congressional hearings preceding the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See id. at 5-6. For legislative history, see 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nmws 2482, 2484-86 (1956).
13. For recent legislation see ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 16r 2 , §§ 64-68 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1956), note 51 infra; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 806. For less recent legislation see, e.g.,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 5196 (Supp. 1954) (state comptroller has general suspension and
regulatory powers over corporations formed to hold bank stock); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3220 (1955) (purchases of stock in bank as speculation or to perfect control unlawful).
14. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.5 (g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956) (corporation
may not hold 15% or more of stock of two or more banks) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.101
(Supp. 1955) (corporation may not hold bank stock unless acquired in reorganization of
the bank) ; WASH. Rrv. CODE § 30.04.230 (Supp. 1956) (corporation may not hold more
than 25% of bank's stock). See also notes 13 supra, 49 infra.
15. The typical anti-branching law prohibits a bank from engaging in business at
more than one office. See, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 16Y2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (1956). To regulate holding companies through
branching laws, the enforcing authority must show that the relationship between the units
is so close that their separate corporate entities can be disregarded, or that a principal-
agent relation exists. Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
84th Cong., Ist Sess. 195 (1955). See CASTLE, ILL. ATr'Y GEN. Ops. 34 (1953), for
the unchallenged opinion of the Illinois Attorney General that a bank which organizes
affiliates whose stock it planned to hold in trust would violate the branch banking law.
But the Illinois branch law does not prevent penetration by typical holding companies
since no more than stock ownership by such companies can be shown. Hearings, mpra
at 201, CASTLE, op. cit. supra at 88. Texas has had more success in curbing -holding com-
panies through branch laws. Hearings, supra at 160, 200-01. See HOGENSON, Op. cit.
supra note 10, at 191-92.
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government had done little more than supervise holding company groups em-
bracing national or Federal Reserve "member" banks.16 The recent growth of
bank holding companies increasingly revealed the shortcomings of existing
controls and the need for more stringent federal measures.' 7
In the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.18 Congress seeks to regulate
the excess concentration and unsound practices engendered by this form of
group banking.' The act defines a bank holding company as a corporation
owning at least twenty-five per cent of the voting stock in two or more banks.-'
To minimize the undue reciprocal competitive advantages inherent in equity
union between a bank and non-banking corporations, holding companies are
required to divest themselves of most non-banking subsidiaries.2 1 They may
retain only those "financial, fiduciary, or insurance" affiliates which the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System determines to be "closely related"
to banking.2 2 Transfers of funds from affiliate banks to parent holding com-
panies are prohibited so that subsidiary banks cannot be plundered by stock
dealings or manipulation of loans.2 3 But most important, the act limits holding
company expansion. Before an existing holding company may acquire the
assets of or stock in a bank, or before a new holding company may be formed.
16. The Banking Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.), requires a holding company to obtain a voting permit from the Federal Re-
serve Board before it can vote its stock in a national or other member bank. To obtain
the permit a holding company has to submit to examinations, make financial reports and
maintain certain reserves of marketable assets. 48 STAT. 186 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 61 (1952). A corporation can easily avoid these restrictions by limiting its holdings to
non-member banks, by not voting the bank stock or by maintaining control through friend-
ly interests. See Comment, 1 STAN. L. REv. 658, 665-66 (1949). Chairman Martin of the
Board of Governors concluded: "In effect, therefore, regulation is largely voluntary on
the part of the holding company." Hearings, supra note 15, at 13.
17. See, e.g., 102 CONG. REc. 6858-60 (1956) (statement of Senator Douglas (Ill.));
Comment, 1 STAN. L REv. 658 (1949).
18. 70 STAT. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1848 (1957). For discussions of the act
generally, see Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 333 (1957) ; 31 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 146 (1956).
19. H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1955). See notes 11-12 supra.
20. 70 STAT. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (1957). Exceptions to this basic defini-
tion are recognized. Ibid.
21. 70 STAT. 135 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843 (1957). See, e.g., Hearings, supra note
10, at 64, 124. Divestment, of course, is also designed to protect depositors' funds from
the risk of improper investment in the non-banking holding company affiliates. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1955) ; Hearings, supra note 15, at 509.
22. The holding companies are given two years, which the Board may extend to five,
to divest themselves of prohibited non-banking subsidiaries. 70 STAT. 135 (1956), 12 U.S.
C.A. § 1843 (1957).
23. 70 STAT. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1845 (1957). See H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955). "Cross-stream" transactions (transfers of funds from bank
to non-banking affiliates) are also prohibited. 70 STAT. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1845
(1957). However, the act does not prohibit "downstream" transactions (transfers from
parent to bank) on the premise that the added security given the bank outweighs the dis-
advantage to its independent competitors which cannot secure funds so easily. Compare,
e.g., Hearings, supra note 15, at 131, 235, with, e.g., Hearings, supra note 10, at 64, 124.
For other exceptions, see 70 STAT. 137 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1845 (1957).
NOTES
specific federal authorization must be received from the Board of Governors.2 4
And this authorization can be given only after the transaction has been con-
sidered with respect to its effect on banking concentration generally, and more
specifically, with respect to its effect on the convenience, needs and welfare of
the area concerned.2 5
In limiting holding company expansion, Congress has reconciled imposition
of national control with preservation of state regulation. The federal-state
balance is defined by two sections of the act based on the premise that limita-
tions on this expansion should ultimately be geared to state policy. Section
3(d) restricts Board discretion over interstate transactions: expansion into a
state may be approved only where the state has legislated expressly to permit
foreign corporate acquisition of domestic banks.20 And section 7 preserves to
the states the powers maintained over banks and holding companies prior to
passage of the act.2 7 By thus preserving and expanding their authority, Con-
gress has allowed the states to implement a policy for effective control of
banking concentration. Yet the interplay between state regulation and federal
law raises questions concerning the proper interpretation and enforcement of
state policy.
Standing alone, the preservation of powers in section 7 gives the states only
formal authority. State control of branch banking-the practice of conducting
banking operations at more than one office-has been of little effect in limit-
ing concentration. Although the McFadden Act extended state regulation of
branching to national banks by adopting state standards as the governing fed-
24. 70 STArT. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(a) (1957). On receiving an application
for approval involving a national bank, the Board must notify the Comptroller of the
Currency. In the case of a state bank, the appropriate state supervisory authority must be
notified. A hearing is mandatory only if the notified authority disapproves the transaction.
70 STAT. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(b) (1957). See Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 333, 342
(1957). Approval is also required for merger and consolidation of holding companies.
70 STAT. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(a) (1957). For acquisitions which may be
allowed without Board approval, see note 48 infra.
25. 70 STAT. 135 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c) (1957).
26. Id. § 1842(d). Section 3(d) provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application shall be approved
under this section which will permit any bank holding company or any subsidiary
thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or
substantially all of the assets of any additional bank located outside of the State in
which such bank holding company maintains its principal office and place of busi-
ness or in which it conducts its principal operations unless the acquisition of such
shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is specif-
ically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by
language to that effect and not merely by implication."
27. 70 STALT. 139 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1846 (1957). Section 7 provides:
"The enactment by the Congress of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 shall
not be construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers and juris-
diction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding
companies, and subsidiaries thereof."
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eral law,28 the impact of the resulting controls has been avoided by resort to
holding company structure ;29 and the local sovereign's inherent power over
domestic corporations has been equally ineffective in limiting bank growth.
True, a state has wide discretion to restrain the conduct of foreign corpora-
tions doing business within its borders 30 as well as virtually unlimited power
to regulate the conduct of an organization incorporated under its laws.3' Thus
it may control the activities of foreign holding companies doing business local-
ly as well as those of domestic banks and holding companies. But most foreign
holding companies are beyond its reach; for a corporation merely owning state
bank stock does not come within the definition of doing business. 32 Moreover,
except with regard to tangential matters and its indirect control over branch-
ing, a state is without power to regulate national banks.3 3 This dual exemption
28. 44 STAT. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1952). The Banking Acts
of 1.933, 48 STAT. 189, and 1935, 49 STAT. 708, amplified the McFadden Act and continued
its principles. Congressional adoption of state law as a standard was effected by granting
branch powers to national banks to the same extent that the state in which the national
bank was located granted them to state banks. The 1956 act was considered a logical con-
tinuation of the principles of the McFadden Act. 102 CONG. Rac. 6860 (1956) (Senator
Douglas (Ill.), introducing § 3(d) as an amendment).
29. Hearings, supra note 10, at 107; see CARTINHOUR, BRANcH, GROUP' AND CHAIN
BANKING 120-27 (1931) ; Comment, 1 STAN. L. Rav. 658, 662 (1949).
30. See, generally, 17 FLErcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 8386-45 (perm.
and rev. ed. 1933) (hereinafter cited as FLETCHFR). Conditions repugnant to the Consti-
tution may not be imposed. E.g., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (state
may not require waiver of the right to resort to federal courts) ; Brust v. First Nat'l
Bank, 184 Wis. 15, 198 N.W. 749 (1924) (state powerless to prohibit national bank from
doing business within the state) (dictum).
31. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 441 (1894) ; see Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 544-45 (1933) (dissenting opinion) ; 1 FLETcHER § 114.
32. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) ; People's Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Fergus Motors, Inc. v. Standard-
Triumph Motor Co., 130 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The parent company is subject
to state regulation only if the corporate entities can be viewed as one or if agency can
be established. See cases collected Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 187 (1951). But see Bankers'
Holding Corp. v. Maybury, 161 Wash. 681, 297 Pac. 740 (1931) (foreign corporation held
subject to state regulatory power because organized for specific purpose of holding stock
in and managing domestic corporations). Bankers, Holding Corp. is dubious authority,
however. See statement of the Attorney General of Washington:
"[T]he case was in a minority of one at the time of decision . . . was the subject
of critical comment at the time, 40 YALE LJ. 1322, and . . . no court, including the
Washington Supreme Court, has cited the case as authority for the proposition which
forms the holding of the case."
Hearings, supra note 15, at 333. There were repeated references during the Hearings t-)
states' inability to regulate foreign holding companies. See, e.g., id. at 113, 164-65, 175, 362.
33. Congress has yielded control over branch powers. See note 28 supra. Under the
principles set out in note 5 supra, state law regulates many aspects of national bank oper-
ation, such as the construction of contracts, transfer or escheat of property, creation of
debts and liability to suit. 7 MIcHIE c. 15, § 5. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
292 U.S. 559, 566 (1934) ; McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347 (1896). But management
and control of national banks are beyond state authority. Thus states may not regulate
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from local rule has rendered nugatory any extensive use of the sovereignty
powers. With foreign corporate acquisition of national banks not subject to
limitation, any stringent state regulation would impair the utility of the state
banking system rather than seriously deter concentration. State banks could
avoid restrictions placed upon their acquisition by reincorporating under a
national charter; and in view of the recent tendency toward interstate union,
such shifts would be likely.3 4 Since domestic holding companies cannot avoid
state limitations, restricting their expansion would place them at a serious
competitive disadvantage with foreign corporations.
However, section 3(d) gives the states the comprehensive authority re-
quired for effective and equitable control of holding company expansion. The
section allows each state to prevent union between foreign holding companies
and local state or federal banks. Because foreign penetration is thus limited,
local supervision of domestic banking growth can no longer be circumvented
by state bank defection to the national system. And with the advent of general
holding company control, branch banking regulations will become increasingly
important. Only by integrating its controls over holding companies and branch
banking, may a state effect the expansion policy it finds best suited to domestic
needs.35 New York, for example, has been quick to recognize and employ the
authority delegated by section 3(d) ; it has recently enacted restrictive legis-
lation to forestall several significant prospective transactions.36
matters such as liquidation, stockholder liability and director's duties. 7 MICHIE C. 15,
§ 5. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954) ; Forrest v. Jack,
294 U.S. 158, 162 (1935) ; note 5 supra.
34. See note 6 supra. In particular, Transamerica Corporation, which had banks in
5 states at the end of 1954, Hearings, supra note 10, at 52, had expanded into 11. states by
the end of 1956. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1957, p. 47, col. 6. As of Dec. 31, 1954, Northwest
Bancorporation had banks in 7 states; First Bank Stock Corporation in 4 states; First
Security Corporation in 3 states; General Contract Corporation in 3 states. H.R. REP.
No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955) ; Hearings, supra note 10, at 51-52; 102 CONG.
REC. 6358-59 (1956).
35. Absent such integration, a foreign company holding one bank in the state could
expand by simply branching that bank. See text at note 40 infra; M. A. SCHAPIRO & Co.,
TiE TRIPLE BANKING SYsTEM 27 (1956).
36. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 806. New York is interested not so much in blocking
lank holding companies per se, as in preserving its law limiting branch banking to the
nine banking districts into which the state has been divided. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105.
The branch law has stopped upstate expansion by the giant New York City banks.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1956, § 3, p. 1, col. 1. Exerting its power preserved by § 7 of the
federal act, supra note 27, New York forbids a company organized or doing business with-
in the state to acquire more than 25% of the stock of each of two or more banks located
in different banking districts. However, a holding company may be freely formed within
a banking district. The legislation was precipitated by a proposed holding company union
between the First National City Bank of New York City and the Westchester County
Trust Co. located in different banking districts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1956, § 3, ,p. 1, col.
1. New York imposed these restrictions anticipating widespread hurdling of the district
lines by city banks following the population shift to the suburbs. Compare N.Y. Times,
Mar. 28, 1957, p. 43, col. 5, qit*h N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1956, § 3, p. 1, col. 1. However,
negotiations toward holding company structure continue, with the banks raising the con-
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While section 3(d) increases the effectiveness of local policy by requiring
that the Board disapprove expansion into a state which has not expressly
authorized foreign corporate acquisition of domestic banks, it does not ade-
quately set forth the criteria for determining the situs of a holding company,
and thus its "foreign" character. The section defines situs as "the State in
which such bank holding company maintains its principal office and place of
business or in which it conducts its principal operations. . . . Under the
interpretation most often advanced, "place of principal operations" would mean
the state in which the greatest number of subsidiary banks is located. 38 Where
such state is not the same as that of the corporation's principal office, one of
the two states would have to be chosen as the permanent section 3(d) resi-
dence. Although Congress did not expressly consider whether this choice
should lie with the Board or the holding company, the committee hearings
indicate that the selection could be made by either and that the Board would
issue regulations declaring which alternative would be utilized. 0 However,
allowing the holding company to make this choice might enable it to expand
in the chosen situs unfettered by domestic control. The provisions of section
3(d) would not be applicable since the expanding company would be domestic
rather than foreign. Moreover, should the corporation neither be chartered
nor conduct business other than mere ownership of bank stock in the designated
state, the state's section 7 powers would be equally useless. Of course, the
latter requirement could be met only if the corporation chose the state where
its subsidiaries were most numerous rather than the one in which its principal
office was located.40 And although the possibility of uncontrolled expansion in
a state already marked by the corporation's greatest growth may not im-
mediately appear a serious problem, holding companies are in fact anxious to
expand in just such states and would probably be quick to take advantage of
stitutional question whether a state has the right to condition ownership of stock in a
national bank. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1957, § 3, p. 1, col. 8. But New York is, consistent
with § 7, exercising its control over the franchise powers of corporations, not acting
directly on national bank stock.
37. 70 STAT. 135 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d) (1957).
38. Throughout the hearings preceding passage of the act, "place of operations" was
used to describe the states in which subsidiary banks were located. See, e.g., Hearings,
supra note 10, at 50; Hearings, supra note 15, at 113. Thus, "place of principal operations"
would describe the state in which the subsidiaries were most numerous. The commentators
have made no attempt to clarify the meaning of the passage quoted in text. They have
referred to the situs state variously as that of the holding company's: (1) "principal place
of business," Comment, 9 STAN. L. Rrv. 333, 338 (1957) ; (2) "principal office," Note,
31 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 146, 151 (1956); (3) "home state," NADLER, THE BANKING
SITUATION IN NEW YORK STATE 121 (1956) ; (4) "principal operations," M. A. SCHAPIRO
& Co., THE TRIPLE BANKING SvST m 28 (1956).
39. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 128-29; cf. proposals of the American Bankers
Association, id. at 289, 292-93.
40. If the corporation chose the state in which its principal office was located, it would
be doing more business than merely holding bank stock and thus be subject to state regu-
lation. See text at note 30 supra.
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the loophole allowing them to do so at will.41 By issuing regulations denying
the choice between alternative situs states to the corporation, however, the
Board can obviate this difficulty, since it would always be able to choose a
residence permitting state control and thus insure that the declared policy of
the act would be effectuated.
More important are the unique problems of federalism which will result
from the means Congress has employed to give effect to state policy. Section
3(d) does not allow direct regulation by the states of foreign corporate ex-
pansion within their borders. Rather, it grants them indirect control by adopt-
ing as the governing federal law the provisions of state law regulating foreign
corporate acquisition of state-chartered banks. And the section presumes that
absent express state legislation, no foreign penetration would be permissible.42
This legislative delegation to the states, patterned on the McFadden Act, does
not raise constitutional problems. Although the states fix expansion standards,
the federal law adopts and applies them. And as Congress has absolute au-
thority to regulate banking, it properly may implement these powers by adopt-
ing the provisions of state legislation.43 Instead, the problems inherent in the
legislation result from the fact that once state expansion policy is crystallized
into federal law, all state contact with the administration of that policy vanishes.
Although the states have jurisdiction specifically preserved by section 7 to
proceed upon violation of their own laws, they have no power to initiate pro-
ceedings under the legislation incorporated by section 3(d). For without ex-
press congressional authorization, states may proceed neither civilly nor crim-
41. Transamerica Corporation, for example, after acquiring subsidiary banks in sev-
eral states, expanded in California, the state in which its subsidiaries were most numerous
prior to expanding in any other state. And when Transamerica began expanding in other
states, it continued to expand in California at a significantly greater rate. See MooDy's,
MANUAL OF INVESTMENTs 968-69 (1954) (hereinafter cited as MOODY'S).
Some of the California acquisitions were accomplished through branching. Compare
MOODY'S 864 (1946), with MooDY'S 968-69 (1957). In a state stringently regulating
branching, of course, the holding company would have to resort to new acquisitions in
order to expand.
42. Only when the state has expressly legislated to authorize out-of-state holding com-
pany acquisition of a state bank may the Board approve any foreign holding company
acquisition. See § 3(d), note 26 supra. As to the meaning of "expressly legislated," see
note 50 infra.
43. The constitutional grant to Congress of "all legislative powers" has been judicially
interpreted to forbid delegation of such powers to the executive or judicial branches of the
federal government, or to any other governmental body. Jefferson, The Supreme Court
and State Separation and Delegation of Powers, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1944).
Delegation of effective control by adoption of the law of another jurisdiction does not
violate this principle. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902) (bank-
ruptcy) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (taxation) ; Permissive Limits
of Delegation of Legislative Power, Annot., 79 L. Ed. 474, 507-09 (1934) ; Mermin, "Co-
operative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of
Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 YALE L.J. 1, 4-26 (1947) ; see note 46
infra.
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inally to enforce federal law.44 And though the standards of section 3(d) are
adopted by reference to state legislation, the resulting law is federal. Thus the
act provides for federal action upon willful violation of its terms, and the penal-
ties prescribed are to be imposed in criminal proceedings brought by the At-
torney General of the United States.45
But the states are unable to insure that their policies will be respected in
federal enforcement of section 3(d). Since domestic interpretations of enact-
ments adopted by reference are not incorporated into the federal law, the
Board and the courts applying section 3(d) will not be bound by state con-
structions of such enactments.40 And though the states have substantial interest
44. A federal criminal statute must specifically authorize state action for a state to
assist in its enforcement. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (prohibition) ;
Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910) (naturalization). Nor may a state en-
force federal regulatory law through civil process without federal consent. McClung v.
Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state court lacks authority to issue mandamus
to federal officer); Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37
N.E.2d 225 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 918 (1942) (state not permitted to mandamus a
Federal Reserve Bank to perform its statutory duty of determining and reporting a buy-
ing rate) ; Attorney Gen. ex rel. State Banking Comm'r v. National Bank, 338 Mich. 610,
61 N.W.2d 804 (1.953) (state attorney general lacks authority to bring quo warranto pro-
ceedings in state court to challenge national bank's right to establish a state forbidden
branch). The Michigan court distinguished cases allowing state enforcement on the ground
that Congress' leaving the matter to be governed by state law constituted a valid delega-
tion. See, e.g., Ex parte Worcester County Nat'l Bank, 279 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1929) (trust
powers of state bank consolidated into national bank are continued as latter's only when
"not in contravention of state law") ; First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416 (1917)
(same). And it held the subject governed by federal law even though such law was based
on state provisions. )See text at note 33 supra; note 28 supra. See, generally, Note, Linita-
tions on State Judicial Interference with Federal Activities, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 84, 91-94
(1951).
45. 70 STAT. 138 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1847 (1957). Even without such specific pro-
vision, the Board could compel holding company obedience by exercising its power to re-
voke the "voting permit" required of holding companies to vote their stock in national and
member banks. See note 16 supra. The ultimate sanction for flouting Board authority is
revocation of the subsidiary banks' membership in the federal reserve system. 48 STAT.
186 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1952).
The Board requested enforcement by the Department of Justice with criminal penalties
for violation, rather than by the administering agency. Hearings, supra note 15, at 14. And
it did not contemplate making advisory determinations of whether a transaction would
violate the act. Hearings, supra note 10, at 61. Lack of independent power in the Board,
however, may hamper enforcement, since the Attorney General can penalize only willful
violations, and good faith infractions may thus escape correction. 70 STAT. 138 (1956),
12 U.S.C.A. § 1847 (1957). Compare the use of supoena power, mandamus, injunction
and restraining order authorized to the administering agency in the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 831, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 7 9r (1952).
46. A state's reading of its federally adopted law is not controlling. See HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Sys=M 456-57 (1953). The Assimi-
lated Crimes Act, REV. STAT. § 5391 (1875), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), adopts
state law by reference. Acts done in areas under the jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment, such as army reservations or federal buildings, which would be punishable under
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in insuring the applicability of their laws and in preserving their intended
interpretations, they do not meet the requirements of the provisions authoriz-
ing judicial review and thus cannot challenge Board rulings. 4 7 Accordingly,
state law, are made federal offenses subject to the same penalties. In Johnson v. Yellow
Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1.944), Oklahoma, a dry state, had seized liquor in transit
to an army post within its jurisdiction and claimed an Assimilated Crimes Act violation.
The Supreme Court said: "That broad question, [violation of the Assimilated Crimes
Act] though some parts of it involve a consideration of the proper scope of the state law
adopted by the federal government, is in the final analysis a question of the correct inter-
pretation of a federal criminal statute, and therefore an issue upon which federal courts
are not bound by the rulings of the state courts." Id. at 391. See also MfcCoy v. Pescor,
145 F2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1944) (state decision on sufficiencies of indictment not control-
ling in Assimilated Crimes Act prosecution); cf. 54 MicH. L. Rxv. 851 (1956).
47. Section 9 of the act, which provides for judicial review of Board rulings, provides
that: "Any party aggrieved by an order of the Board under this Act may obtain a review
of such order in the United States Court of Appeals.. . " 70 STAT. 138 (1956), 12 U.S.
C.A. § 1848 (1957). A party who has suffered an actual or threatened deprivation of a
legal right meets the requirement of having been aggrieved. See Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1947) ; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (requiring injury or threat to a personal right, as distinguished
from the public's interest in the administration of the law) ; Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc.
v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D.D.C. 1953) (requiring invasion of "private sub-
stantive legally protected interest"). In the absence of such harm, standing to secure
judicial review is generally lacking. But the law determining standing is complex and
confused. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 676-77 (1951). Comparc Perkins v. Lukens Steel,
Co., supra (no standing since no injury to government supplier from wage determination
affecting future bids); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (no standing
since only damage threatened to power companies was from lawful competition) ; Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. densied, 350 U.S.
884 (1955) (same), with United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(standing because regulations limited future expansion); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (standing since radio station financially injured by issuance
of license to competitor).
The interest required to secure review has been found on slight foundation. E.g., Okla-
homa v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, supra (state could obtain review of deter-
mination that its highway employee violated Hatch Act, since determination would result
in withholding portion of federal highw%-ay funds, and state found to have legally enforce-
able right to receive allocated grants without unlawful deductions). Although it might
be argued that a state seeking review of a Board determination under the Bank Holding
Company Act has a legal right created by § 3(d) to refuse or permit holding company
entry and that an improper Board interpretation is an infringement of this right, such
state would probably not have even the interest found in Oklahoma. For the interest in-
vaded there, as well as that involved in the authorities collected supra, wras financial, and
the interest under § 3(d) cannot be so rationalized. -And even if the state's interest were
claimed to be regulatory, the same result would be dictated by the fact that the law
adopted by § 3(d) is federal not state. See text at note 45 tspra. Moreover, the Bank
Holding Company Act does not require a state to be admitted as a party. See § 3(b), 70
STAT. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(b) (1957). And, even if the Board allowed a state
to intervene, the state might still be unable to secure judicial review. See, e.g., Boston
Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 632 (1944); DAvis, ADxMuIS-rAT vE LAwY
689-91 (1951).
Under the act, only an "order" of the Board can be reviewed. See § 9, supra. But
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where a holding company has effected an acquisition without obtaining the
requisite approval,48 where the Board has interpreted an incorporated law in
a manner which conflicts with state intent " and where in like situations
domestic banking may be materially influenced by Board decisions, 0 the state
review may not reach all orders since many will not be based on hearings producing re-
viewable records. See 9 STAN. L. REv. 333, 342 n.93 (1957) ; Developments in the Lazw.-
Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 908 (1957).
Review may also be had under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT.
243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952) (including actions for declaratory judgments and
suits for preventive or mandatory injunctions). But, again, the requirements of legal right
or interest must be met. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76, 78
(E.D. Mo.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
McKay, supra. See Developnents in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and
Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827, 920 n.657 (1957). Since Board findings of fact sup-
ported by substantial evidence are conclusive, a holding that state intent is a question of
fact would limit the scope of review on the propriety of the Board's interpretation. 70
STAT. 139 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1848 (1957). For a comprehensive treatment of review
of administrative action, see Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United
States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. Rxv. 827, 910-23; DAvis, ADMIISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 199-229, 234-57 (1951).
48. The act is unclear as to whether a holding company is required to have obtained
Board approval prior to effecting certain types of acquisitions. Section 3(a) states:
"It shall be unlawful except with the prior approval of the Board (1) for any action
to be taken which results in a company becoming a bank holding company under
section 2(a) of this Act; (2) for any bank holding company to acquire direct or
indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisi-
tion, such company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum
of the voting shares of such bank; (3) for any bank holding company or subsidiary
thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank;
or for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any other bank hold-
ing company...."
70 STAr. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(a) (1957). Thus, whether bank stock dividends
may be acquired without prior approval of the Board is uncertain. Cf. the New York
Bank Holding Companies Act which expressly excepts these dividends from acquisition
restrictions. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142; see note 36 supra. And the acquisition by a
subsidiary bank of all the assets of another bank without Board approval also may or may
not be a violation. For while § 3(a) (3) appears to allow this transaction, such interpreta-
tion might conflict with § 3 (a) (2) which requires that a holding company seek approval
prior to direct or indirect acquisition of more than 5% of the voting shares of a bank.
49. The Illinois Bank Holding Corporation Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 162, §§ 64-68
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956), for example, forbids future acquisition by a holding company,
including a foreign holding company, of more than 15% of the stock of two or more
banks. Whether and to what extent this provision specifically, rather than impliedly,
authorizes foreign corporate penetration as required by § 3(d), is likely to be the subject
of conflicting interpretation. In an analogous situation under the McFadden Act which
also requires specific language, similar legislation was found to give the necessary au-
thorization. 37 Ops. A'T'y GEN. 325 (1,933).
50. The transactions encompassed by § 3(a) may be of considerable interest to the
state in which the participating banks and holding companies are located. In § 3(c)
Congress recognizes local interest by specifying that one of the factors which the Board
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can only request that federal action conform to domestic policy. And this re-
quest may be neglected or ignored.51
Nevertheless, full implementation of state expansion policy may be achieved
under the act. The limited role of the states in administering the standards of
section 3(d) is in part dictated by constitutional limitations on congressional
delegation to the statesY2 In the instant legislation, Congress might have given
the states more executive authority. But the exact extent of permissible control
in this area can not be ascertained, since the boundaries of legitimate delega-
tion generally are unclearY3 In any event, the congressional purpose to achieve
effective holding company control is apparent. With some exceptions,"4 this
end is sought by means of federal regulation through Board supervision. How-
must take into account when passing on an acquisition is "the convenience, needs, and
welfare of the communities and area concerned." See text at note 25 supra; 70 STAT.
135 (1956), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c) (1957). Moreover, § 3(b) requires that the Board
seek, though not necessarily follow, the advice of the appropriate state official when a state
bank is to be acquired. Ibid.
51. A state can be assured that its policies will be effected only if it has passed no
enabling legislation. For under this circumstance, due to the presumption built into § 3 (d),
the Board cannot approve foreign penetration. But while a state may consciously adopt
such an absolute policy against holding company acquisition where the concentration in
its banking facilities is high, e.g. New York, see note 36 supra, most states have not and
probably will not take such a restrictive attitude. Even Illinois, a citadel of home-owned
banking, merely restricts, but does not exclude, foreign bank holding companies. Georgia
has identical legislation. Ga. S. 30, Jan.-Feb. session, approved, Feb. 27, 1956; see 102
CoNG. REc. 6752-53 (1956). Many states have not even attempted to limit concentration
through anti-branch laws. In fact, Nevada, prompted by widespread bank failures during
the depression, officially invited a bank holding company (Transamerica) to enter and
stabilize its banks. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1950). Moreover, a state already contain-
ing powerful holding companies would appear not unlikely to prefer to maintain com-
petition by authorizing the entrance of other holding companies. But see 9 STAN. L. Rv.
333, 338 (1957).
52. As to delegation by adoption of standards set out by another governmental unit,
see note 43 supra; Mermin, supra note 43, at 23 n.57. Delegation of authority to regulate
in an otherwise federal field may also be based on a theory of congressional "consent" or
"divestment of protection." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (Con-
gress may consent to state insurance regulation otherwise invalid for discriminating against
interstate commerce) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431. (1936) (power to enforce laws
forbidding sale of convict-made goods in interstate commerce was granted to states by
divesting such goods of the protection of interstate commerce) ; In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545, 564 (1891) (power to enforce prohibition laws against liquor in interstate commerce
was given to states by divesting protection). See Mermin, supra note 43, at 21, 22 &
nn.56, 57, for an exhaustive discussion of the consent and divestment theories.
53. For discussion of the general problem see, Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 359, 561 (1947) ; Mermin, supra note 43; Jacoby,
Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review: A Study in Comparative Law, 36 COLuM.
L. REV. 871 (1936). See also 54 MicH. L. REv. 851 (1956).
54. See note 49 supra. Subsidiary banks would seem able to merge unfettered by the
restrictions of § 3(a) (2). See Note, 9 STAN. L. Rrv. 333, 348-50 (1957) ; M. A. ScHAPiRO
& Co., THE TanIPLE BANKING SYSTEm 27 (1,956). But see note 48 supra.
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ever, the policy of sections 3(d) and 7 is also of great import. Congress has
expressed its desire to let local policy govern holding company expansion un-
less clearly unsuited to broader national interests. And this result can be
accomplished within the framework of the act if the federal authorities recog-
nize the value of state assistance. Once the state has performed the integral
function of enacting the legislation forming the basis of section 3(d), its re-
maining role is advisory. The Board and the courts should avail themselves of
this role to insure that the expansion policy they apply is in fact that formu-
lated by the state and intended by Congress.
